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SYMPOSIUM 1999

Women, Equity and Federal Tax Policy: Open

Questions
Keynote Address:
Marriage Penalties and Bonuses in the Federal
Income Tax

June ONeill*
The income tax system in the United States is not marriage
neutral. According to estimates of the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) about 22 million married couples will pay higher taxes this
year than they would if they were single. They will pay a marriage
penalty, averaging close to $1,500 per couple. Less well known is
that another 26 million couples will get a marriage bonus. The taxes
paid by these couples are lower by about $1,600 per couple as a
consequence of marriage. In recent years the number of married
couples incurring marriage penalties has increased, thus raising
questions of fairness. But it is also important to consider efficiency,
since the current tax treatment of families and individuals creates both
work and marriage disincentives.
The country's long standing commitment to a progressive
income tax is the underlying source of the problem. If taxpayers at all
income levels faced the same tax rate - in other words, if the income
tax was a proportional tax - there would be no marriage penalty or
bonus. For example, at a 20 percent single tax rate, John Doe earning
$30,000 a year could marry Jane who also earned $30,000, or Jill who
planned to be a full-time homemaker, and his rate in either case would
still be 20 percent. Jane's tax rate would stay the same if she married
John or remained single. And, if instead, Jill married John and
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eventually decided to work, she would also face a 20 percent tax rate.
As long as we remain wedded to the principle of horizontal
equity under a progressive tax system, marriage and work choices can
significantly affect our tax liabilities. That principle calls for families
with the same total money income to pay the same tax, implying that
the tax unit should be the family, not the individual. For example, in a
progressive system that taxed individuals based on their own earnings,
a husband-wife family, with one worker earning $60,000, would pay
higher taxes than the sum of the taxes paid by a husband and wife who
each earned $30,000. And that would violate horizontal equity. Of
course, it is not crystal clear that the principle of horizontal equity is
equitable. Are two couples with the same $60,000 total money
income really equally well off, if in one case the $60,000 is earned by
one worker whose spouse is a full-time homemaker, while in the other
case the husband and wife each work full-time earning $30,000?
Over the years, changes in both the income tax and the work
patterns of married women have brought these issues to the fore. The
federal personal income tax was introduced in the United States in
1913 and between 1913 and 1948 the law applied to individuals, all of
who filed on the same progressive rate schedule, regardless of marital
status. A progressive income tax levied on individuals, in principle
would have violated horizontal equity. However, prior to World War
II the income tax only applied to a very small proportion of the
population, and two earner couples were rare. (The proportion of
married women working outside the home was only 6 percent in 1900
and 14 percent in 1940.)
During World War II the federal income tax was greatly
expanded in size and in progressivity. Once the war was over,
pressures for a tax cut were intense. The vast majority of the
taxpaying population consisted of husband-wife families with a single
earner. Many of them were GIs and their brides, adding sentiment to
support for a tax cut that would particularly benefit such families.
Spurred by the example set in community property states, the idea
took hold of allowing couples to file a joint return in which their
combined income would be split in half, with taxes paid on each half
regardless of the actual distribution of earnings between the spouses.
In 1948, the Congress codified income splitting for all couples
in the form of joint filing. As a result, most married couples paid
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lower taxes then they would if they were single, and the marriage
bonus was born. However, single taxpayers viewed joint filing not as
a bonus for couples but rather as a "singles' penalty" which caused
them to pay higher taxes than they would if they were married. Under
growing pressure from single taxpayers, the Congress in 1969 altered
income tax brackets to limit "singles' penalties," lowering taxes on
individual returns relative to those on joint returns. That action
created marriage penalties for some couples - those who were not
getting bonuses - while continuing marriage bonuses for others.
Subsequent tax legislation has altered the size of penalties and
the couples they affect. For example, the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), introduced in 1975, provided tax relief for low-income
working families with children. But it also created a new source of
marriage penalties for those families by failing to distinguish between
one and two earner families.
In 1981, responding to pressure from the growing number of
couples paying marriage penalties, the Congress reduced those
penalties by enacting the two-earner deduction. The two-earner
deduction allowed two-earner couples to deduct 10 percent of the
earnings of the lower-earning spouse, up to $30,000. The two-earner
deduction was eliminated by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. But
embedded in the broad reform of the 1986 legislation was an
alternative means of addressing the problem. This legislation cut the
number of tax brackets from 15, with a maximum rate of 50 percent,
to just two, with a maximum rate of 28 percent (33 percent in a certain
range); it thereby flattened the tax rate structure sharply and reduced
the incidence and size of marriage penalties and bonuses. However,
the tax reform of 1986 did not last, and the addition of three rate
brackets in 1990 and 1993 as well as a hike in the maximum rate,
once again increased progressivity and with it increased the size of
both marriage penalties and bonuses. Finally, the Taxpayer Relief Act
of 1997 created additional marriage penalties for some, and bonuses
for others, by phasing out eligibility for individual retirement
arrangements and child and education credits over various income
ranges.
Over the past 25 years, as a result of increases in the labor
force participation and earnings of women, substantial shifts have
occurred in the mix of taxpayers incurring penalties and receiving
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bonuses. Between 1969 and 1995, the fraction of working-age
couples in which both spouses had paid employment increased from
48 percent to 72 percent. During the same period, the incomes of
husbands and wives in two-earner couples became more nearly equal.
In 1969, 17 percent of two-earner couples had each spouse
contributing at least one-third of total earnings; by 1995, that share
had doubled to 34 percent. Those two changes - an increase in twoearner couples and greater equality of spouses' earnings - occurred
for couples at all income levels, in all age categories, and regardless of
whether they had children. Greater equality of earnings between
husbands and wives makes marriage penalties more likely and larger.
As a result, the overall effect of those shifts in women's work
participation and earnings has been to increase the number of couples
incurring penalties and to boost the size of the average penalty.
At present, the distribution of marriage penalties and bonuses
varies markedly across the income distribution. CBO estimates for
1999 suggest that only 14 percent of couples with income below
$20,000 will pay penalties and 59 percent will receive bonuses. That
situation occurs because only one-third of low-income couples have
two earners. In contrast, more than three-fourths of couples with
income above $20,000 have two earners. As income rises, the
proportion of couples paying the marriage penalty rises. Among
couples with total incomes of $100,000 or more, 56 percent are
expected to pay a penalty; 44 percent will get a bonus.
WORK AND MARRIAGE DISINCENTIVES

The issue of inequities spurs much of the current concern
about marriage penalties. Clearly it is not fair for two people to pay
higher taxes just because they are married. However, we should also
be concerned with penalties (and bonuses) because of the work and
marriage disincentives they create. Joint filing generally causes the
lower-earning spouse

-

usually the wife -

to face a higher tax rate

then she would based on her own earnings, filing on a single return.
Such higher tax rates may induce people - particularly those with
significant non-market alternatives (like child care) - to choose not
to work or to work fewer hours. Moreover, that effect is reinforced by
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the fact that home production of goods and services for family
consumption. is not taxed at all.
Many empirical studies of labor market behavior have found
that workers and particularly married women, respond to changes in
their after-tax wage rates, choosing to work less when their take-home
wage rate falls. Such responses to tax rates not only make affected
couples worse off because their income is lower, but also reduce
national output.
Furthermore, the prospect of facing a tax increase of several
hundred dollars may induce some couples to delay or forgo marriage.
At the same time, marriage bonuses may induce other couples to
marry in order to reduce their tax bills. Economic studies indicate that
such effects are small but statistically significant. Those responses are
further indications of the serious and unintended effects of the income
tax system.

OPTIONS FOR REDUCING OR ELIMINATING MARRIAGE PENALTIES

The changes in legislation and in women's labor market
participation and earnings that have made marriage penalties larger
and more common have brought renewed interest in reducing those
penalties. However, the problem is difficult to fix and satisfying
every goal and everyone's perception of fairness is not possible.
Furthermore, changes that reduce marriage penalties can have impacts
beyond the immediate goals of the legislation.
A variety of options would reduce marriage penalties. One
approach that has been seriously considered in Congress would alter
the current tax code by widening certain tax brackets and raising the
standard deduction for joint filers to twice that for single filers. That
would increase the standard deduction for couples from $7,100 to
$8,500. CBO estimates suggest that this change would eliminate
about 44 percent of the marriage penalty. But it would do so at an
annual cost in terms of lost revenues of at least $25 billion in 1996
dollars. And it would be highly inefficient because more than half of
the revenue cost would go to enlarge the marriage bonuses of couples
already receiving them. For an additional cost of $4 billion bringing the total to $29 billion - the entire marriage penalty could
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be eliminated if couples were allowed to choose between filing jointly
or as individuals. All existing marriage bonuses would continue
under that proposal, but they would not be enlarged.
A more limited and much less costly option would restore the
10 percent deduction on earnings up to $30,000 for the second earner
(the provision in effect between 1982 and 1986). The revenue loss is
estimated to be $9 billion and it would eliminate about one-third of
the marriage penalty.
All marriage penalties and bonuses would be eliminated if
income splitting was eliminated and all filers were required to file
single returns. Such a dramatic change would have no cost to the
Treasury (in fact it would increase revenues a little), but it would
redistribute about $30 billion in tax liabilities from couples now
receiving penalties to those now receiving bonuses. Because some 26
million couples (the current bonus recipients) would face a tax hike
averaging more than $1,300 per couple, I would not predict easy
passage of this proposal.
Finally, the flat tax, which would reduce many inefficiencies
in the current tax system, would have the side benefit of eliminating
(or close to eliminating) marriage distortions both of the penalty and
bonus variety.

FAMILY ISSUES IN SOCIAL SECURITY

Many of the problems regarding the treatment of one and twoearner families in the income tax system, also apply to social security.
Social security, through its tax and benefit structure, provides
substantial subsidies to married couples in which one spouse has little
A wife who works in covered
or no covered employment.
employment, however, will only benefit from the spouse provision if
her own earned benefit is less than her entitlement as a dependent
spouse or widow. But since social security taxes are levied on
individuals, not families, the married woman will pay social security
taxes on the same basis as everyone else, including men whose wives
are homemakers.
Not surprisingly, money's worth calculations that estimate the
lifetime return to social security as an investment, show a sharp
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decline in the net return to married couples' social security tax
payments, as the work experience and consequently the tax payments
of the wife increase. It is also difficult to justify the transfer to oneearner couples on welfare grounds, since it is based on homemaker
status rather than evidence of need. The benefit amount is usually
based on the husband's earnings and women who are homemakers
tend to be married to higher earning men.
As with the marriage penalty, it is not easy to draft solutions
for social security that seem likely to command a political consensus.
But also like the income tax, side benefits to a reform that improves
the efficiency of the program can help to rationalize the treatment of
married individuals in social security. I am referring to a system of
individual retirement accounts in Social Security, which in my
opinion would offer a flexible mechanism for couples to decide for
themselves how they wish to provide for the apportionment of
retirement and survivor benefits.

